How effective are policies aimed at integrating isolated regions? We answer this question using the construction of a highway system in one of the poorest regions in the United States. With construction starting in 1965, the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) ultimately consisted of over 2,500 high-grade road miles. Motivated by a model of interregional trade we estimate the elasticity of total income with respect to market access, which we then use to evaluate the overall impact of the ADHS. We find that removing the ADHS would have reduced the total income by $30.1 billion or, roughly, 3.4 percent in the targeted region. Ultimately, the population response to improvements in transportation infrastructure reduced the gains in income per capita, which were equal to $586 annually in the poorest counties. Today, the region's performance relative to the national average is similar to its position in the 1960s; despite substantial investment in transportation and some gains in income per capita, the region continues to lag behind the rest of the country. * We thank
Introduction
There are large differences in economic performance and individual outcomes across space within the United States and elsewhere. The integration of regions with the national economy may facilitate growth through increased trading opportunities with the rest of the country or increased productivity due to competition and the transfer of frontier technology to underdeveloped regions. At the same time, policymakers must balance concerns at the national level with policies that disproportionately benefit (or harm) particular regions. In the context of the United States, the counties in and around the Appalachian Mountains are among the poorest in the country with income per capita more than 20 percent below the national average.
In the early 1960s, the stark contrast between Appalachia and the rest of the country led the region's governors to lobby the federal government for relief. In 1965, President Johnson signed the Appalachian Regional Development Act, creating the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC)-a federal-state partnership aimed at integrating the region-and fulfilling promises made by the Kennedy Administration. To date, over $34 billion (in 2015 dollars) of federal expenditures have gone to the region, with the bulk of funding going to the construction of the nearly 2,500 miles of the Appalachian Development Highway System.
1
The construction of the Appalachian Development Highway System provides an opportunity to study the long-run impact of a policy aimed at integrating isolated regions.
In this paper, we examine the impact of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) on regional development. Following recent work by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) we use a model of inter-regional trade with perfectly mobile labor together with newly digitized network data of the Appalachian, interstate, national, and state highway systems in 1 The federal portion of expenditures under the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is similar in size to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a large-scale development project initiated as part of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. Total spending on the TVA was approximately approximately $27.5 billion between 1930 and 2000; its impact on regional development was recently studied by Kitchens (2014) and Kline and Moretti (2014) . There was also a state and local matching component of the ARC that was up to an additional 30 percent of federal expenditures depending on the year over the program 's history. 1960, 1985, and 2010 . The model guides the interpretation of our main variable of interest, "market access," which measures each county's proximity to other counties based on the trade costs between county pairs using the highway network and market size.
2 This approach provides a straightforward way to capture how changes at a particular point in the highway network influence all counties. In this way, our measure of market access incorporates network-wide improvements in transportation infrastructure so that our estimates of the effect on total income reflect these general equilibrium effects.
For the empirical analysis we start by computing the travel time between all county pairs in the contiguous United States: for 3,080 counties this gives over four million pairwise travel times. Following Combes and Lafourcade (2005) , we convert travel time into trade costs using information on the cost of inputs for a typical freight shipment and construct "market access" as the proximity of a county to all other counties; specifically, market access for an origin county is the sum of the total income in each destination county weighted by trade costs. We then estimate the elasticity of total income with respect to market access. This elasticity together with counterfactual changes in the market access based on changes to the highway network allow us to quantify the aggregate impact of transportation infrastructure improvements.
Importantly, changes in the measure of market access used in the empirical analysis reflect changes in transportation costs due to improvements in the highway network as well as changes in a county's underlying productivity. We use county fixed effects to address concerns about highway placement with respect to time-invariant local productivity and state-year fixed effect to control for changes in state policy over time. In addition, we include additional variables to control for local highway access and mileage. Finally, we use an instrumental variables strategy to isolate variation in changes in market access based on physical distance and the change in average speed between county pairs due to improvements throughout the transportation network.
3 This allows us to focus on changes in market access due to reduction in travel time over a fixed distance that are plausibly exogenous to the level or growth in local productivity that may have been targeted with highway improvements.
To complement our main empirical analysis, we also check the robustness of our results to several alternatives. First, our main results are derived using all 3,080 counties in the contiguous United States in our estimation sample. That is, we do not allow the elasticity of total income with respect to market access to vary across regions. Although this is consistent with assumptions of our theoretical model, it may not be reasonable in practice.
As robustness, we consider whether the market access elasticity varies for counties included in the ARC or not and find no evidence of a statistically significant difference. 4 Second, we must assume the travel speed used on each type of road in order to compute trade costs.
We use historical sources to assign speeds in our baseline analysis and then consider two alternative scenarios as robustness checks. For example, the Interstate Highway System was graded for speeds up to 70 miles per hour compared with speeds that were sometimes substantially slower than other portions of the network. We use historical sources to assign speeds in our baseline analysis and two alternative scenarios as robustness. Third, the market access variable used in the empirical work is the combination of trade costs and total income in each year. We consider alternative definitions of market size that hold constant the spatial distribution of total income or use population to proxy for market size. Finally, estimates of responsiveness of total income to market access may depend on whether the origin county or surrounding counties are included in the definition of market access. We address this potential source of endogeneity by excluding these counties in some specifications.
With this empirical strategy, we address two main questions. First, how much lower would total income have been in the absence of the ADHS? To do this, we calculate the market access that would have prevailed in 2010 (or 1985) incorporating growth in the highway network from 1960 but removing the ADHS. The counterfactual change in market access together with our estimate of the elasticity implies losses without the ADHS of $24.9 billion of total income annually in 1985 and $33.4 billion annually by 2010. The second question is: how were the potential losses in the absence of the ADHS distributed across the program area of the ARC and the rest of the country? For counties included the ARC, we find losses equal to $30.1 billion (or 90 percent of the total losses) relative to $4.4 billion in counties just outside of the ARC. This suggests placement of the ADHS was reasonably successful at improving market access and increasing total income in the intended counties.
As a second counterfactual, we consider whether losses associated with removing the ADHS could have been mitigated by a proposed, but never built smaller highway system, This is motivated by the fact that large infrastructure projects are often the outcome of politicking to obtain benefits for concentrated interests (e.g., states or congressional districts)
in exchange for support in passing legislation. In the context of the Appalachian Regional Commission, several counties in New York, Mississippi, and elsewhere were added to the initial counties targeted in the earlier plan of the President's Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) during the Kennedy administration. The highway system that was eventually built had almost 1,000 miles that were not included in the first-draft plan. To assess the impact of the deviation from the PARC plan we recalculate market access replacing the ADHS with PARC and find total losses of $13.9 billion. This suggests that the actual ADHS was able to generate benefits roughly proportional to the increase in the number highway miles.
Relative to overall costs-including federal, state and local expenditures-the aggregate benefits of the ADHS imply a rate of return between 3.4 and 6.7 percent annually. This is lower than the 9 percent Allen and Arkolakis (2014) find for the Interstate Highway System or the 11 to 25 percent Alder (2015) finds for highways in India. Compared to historical infrastructure projects, earlier improvements in the transportation network due to the construction of railroads were larger for the United States (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016) and India (Donaldson, forthcoming) .
Overall, the reduction in transportation costs associated with the ADHS increased economic activity in Appalachian counties, although the reallocation of population mitigated gains in income per capita. We find that people moved across counties in response to improved market access, but this did not completely offset rising total income. As a result, we find that income per capita rises and in the absence of the ADHS would have been $586 lower in counties in the ARC program area. This is equal to less than 1 percent of income per capita and accounts for more than half of the convergence of income per capita with the rest of the country between 1960 and 2010.
In addition to recent work by Allen and Arkolakis (2014) , our paper contributes to a substantial literature focused on quantifying the impact of highway infrastructure in the United States (Isserman and Rephann, 1994; Chandra and Thompson, 2000; Baum-Snow, 2007; Michaels, 2008; Duranton and Turner, 2012; Duranton, Morrow, and Turner, 2014) and in developing countries (Banerjee, Duflo, and Qian, 2012; Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner, and Zhang, 2012; Faber, 2014; Ghani, Goswami, and Kerr, 2015) . We use newly digitized maps of the historical US highway network to quantify the aggregate (i.e., national) and targeted (i.e., regional) impact of improved on trading opportunities due to the Appalachian Development Highway System. In this way our paper is similar to work by Kline and Moretti (2014) on the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). They find that the vast majority of the gains from the TVA occurred in counties of the Tennessee River Valley rather than outside the region. We also find that most of the gains were concentrated inside the program area of the ARC.
A related literature focuses on the combined impact of all programs associated with the Appalachian Regional Commission (Bradshaw, 1992; Sanders, 2004, 2007; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008; Haaga, 2004; Widener, 1990; Ziliak, 2012) . We focus exclusively on the impact of the new highway infrastructure associated with the ARC, which we believe requires special attention given (i) the high share of appropriated funds going to the ADHS relative to other programs, (ii) the region's limited integration internally and with the rest of the country, and (iii) the theoretical and empirical issues that arise in assessing interventions with potentially general equilibrium impacts. Importantly, the Appalachian Development Highway System is still maintained today and the expansion of similar systems elsewhere is ongoing (e.g., under the Delta Regional Administration). Our findings suggest some long-run benefits of the new highway system. However, in 2010, counties in the Appalachian Regional
Commission still had income per capita nearly 20 percent below the national average.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the region's history and background for the creation of the Appalachian Regional Commission.
Section 3 describes the highway network and county-level data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the model of trade among counties, empirical specification, and identification concerns that arise in our setting. Section 5 presents our empirical results, counterfactual exercises for the overall impact of Appalachian highways, and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Historical Background
In Night Comes to the Cumberlands, Harry Caudill painted a grim picture of economic conditions in Eastern Kentucky and, more broadly, Appalachia circa 1960. 5 Caudill highlighted the poverty, isolation, exploitation, and destruction of natural resources as well as political backwardness within the region. In the early 1960s average household income in Appalachia was $5,706 compared to $7,349 nationwide. In addition, one-third of families in the region lived on less than $3,000 per year compared to one-fifth in the rest of the country and unemployment in the region was pervasive (Appalachian Regional Commission, 1964; Pollard, 2003) . Over the next several decades differences with the rest of the country in terms of income, poverty, and unemployment narrowed. Despite these gains, policymakers 5 Caudill's Night Comes to the Cumberlands echoes the greater cultural attention paid to poverty represented, for example, by Michael Harrington's The Other America. Eller (1982) and Isenberg (2016) provide background on the economy and society of the Appalachian region from the colonial period through Reconstruction and the present. More recently, Vance (2016) provides an autobiographical account of Appalachian poverty since the 1980s. and scholars remained concerned about the weakness of the labor market, deteriorating infrastructure, the slow rate of structural transformation, and lack of opportunity and mobility.
To combat poverty in the region, individual states initially used their own welfare systems to provide for displaced workers and promote growth. For example, Kentucky created the Agricultural and Industrial Development Board in 1946. 6 This and similar programs at the state level attempted to promote local development and provide subsidies to recruit industry from the North. In 1956, Kentucky created the Action Plan for Eastern Kentucky, which emphasized the need for a regional development authority to improve infrastructure, particularly through new highway construction (Eller, 2008, p. 47 Figure 1A shows the program area of the ARC, including counties in Mississippi and New York that were added in 1967. The largest portion of funds, $840 million, was earmarked to create the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) and remainder to be spent on education, health, and job training programs. The new highway system was intended to complement the expansion of the Interstate Highway System by providing connections to major population centers outside the region. Figure 1B shows the aggregate federal ARC spending separately for highway and non-highway programs. By 2010, over $34 billion had been spent on ARC projects with $23 billion going to highways.
The initial PARC report highlighted the perceived importance of new transportation infrastructure: "Developmental activity in Appalachia cannot proceed until the regional isolation has been overcome. Its cities and towns, its areas of natural wealth and its areas of recreations and industrial potential must be penetrated by a transportation network which provides access to and from the rest of the Nation and within the region itself" (Appalachian In the remainder of this paper, we use detailed data to document the growth of the US highway network and the specific contribution of the Appalachian Development Highway System to improved trading opportunities after 1965. We then quantify the impact of highway expansion on income and use these estimates to assess the aggregate impact of removing on the ADHS. In addition, we ask how the impact of removing of the ADHS was distributed across different US regions. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which gains were concentrated within the counties targeted by the Appalachian Regional Commission. This is important for understanding the specific impact of this policy as well as for assessing the efficacy of using transportation infrastructure to facilitate regional development.
Data
The data for the empirical analysis are drawn from several sources. We use newly digitized maps of the highway network in 1960, 1985, and 2010 to compute the travel time between all county pairs in the contiguous United States in each year. In this section we discuss our representation of the highway network using geographic information system software and the details of calculating travel time. For the empirical analysis we combine the information on travel times with county-level data on income, population, and employment to examine the impact of the ADHS.
We use county-level data on total income, population, and employment in 1960 , 1985 from Haines (2010 and Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015) . In some specifications we report the impact on income per capita, which we compute by dividing total income by population in each county in a given year. We adjust county-level variables to reflect county boundaries in 2010 following the procedure in Hornbeck (2010) and merge independent cities in Virginia with the surrounding county to give a total of 3,080 observations in each year.
To calculate travel times we start by identifying each county as a point in space using the latitude and longitude of the county centroid. We then create a set of access roads that link the county centroids to neighboring counties with straight line connections. These two parts of the network are fixed in 1960, 1985 , and 2010 and a constant speed of 10 miles per hour is assigned to all travel on access roads in each year.
10 Next, we overlay the highway networkincluding the Appalachian, interstate, national, and state highway systems-corresponding to 1960, 1985, or 2010 . The relative importance of each portion of the network for a given route will depend on the distance to be travelled and the assigned speed on each road type. Figure 2C shows the highway network in 2010.
10 Using population-weighted county centroids does not lead to significant differences in county-to-county travel times because of the slow speed assigned to the "access road" network relative to other portions of the highway network.
11 Download the shapefile at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/processes/tools/nhpn/2011/.
In each year, the highway network consists of a combination of roads to which we assign different speeds based on historical sources. For example, we assign segments of the Interstate
Highway System a speed of 65 mph, primary highways a speed of 40 mph, secondary highways a speed of 30 mph, tertiary roads a speeds of 25 mph, and quaternary roads have a speed of 20 mph. Our baseline analysis holds the speeds associated with each portion of the network constant and only allows reductions in travel time to come from the expansion of the network graded for higher speeds. As robustness, we consider the impact of alternative speeds assigned to each portion of the network on our empirical analysis and counterfactuals based on contemporary travel speeds to allow for improvements in the roads and travel conditions. 1998. The theory outlined in the next section uses the "iceberg form" of trade costs, which we obtain by dividing τ cdt by the average value of a freight shipment in 2010 and adding one.
Theory and Empirics
We use a model of inter-regional trade to derive our main estimating equation and inform our identification strategy. This model produces a relationship between total income and access to markets. In this context, market access provides a straightforward way to summarize the impact of a change in transportation costs anywhere in the highway network on total income. Empirically, we exploit changes in market access due to improvements in the interstate and Appalachian highways. We use an instrumental variables strategy to isolate changes in transportation costs that are unrelated to changes in local productivity.
This ensures that our estimate of the relationship between total income and market access is not confounded with the region's growth potential, which motivated the passage of the Appalachian Regional Development Act and the placement of the associated highways.
The model in the remainder of this section follows closely the exposition in Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) .
Model Setup
In the model counties are indexed by c if they are the origin of trade and d if they are the destination. Consumers have CES preferences over a continuum of differentiated goods varieties, where the elasticity of substitution between varieties is given by σ. Producers in each county combine a fixed factor land (L c ) and mobile factors labor (N c ) and capital (K c ) using a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce varieties. The marginal cost of each variety j is:
where q c is the land rental rate, w c is the wage, r c is the interest rate, and z c (j) is local productivity shifter drawn from a Fréchet distribution with CDF F c (z) = exp(−T c z −θ ). We assume that output markets are perfectly competitive.
Trade costs between an c and d take the "iceberg" form: for each unit to arrive at d from c, τ cd ≥ 1 must be shipped. That is, if a variety is produced and sold in the same county the price is p cc (j), while the same variety sold in a different county has price p cd (j) = τ cd p cc (j).
In equilibrium, consumers in counties that are farther away from producers will pay higher prices and, in turn, producers that are farther away from consumers will charge lower prices.
Empirically, we measure bilateral travel costs as the lowest travel time (in hours) between c and d using the highway network.
The land available for production is assumed to be constant in each year. Capital is purchased in national, perfectly competitive markets so the returns on capital are the same in all counties with r c = r. To the extent that this assumption is violated in our setting, our empirical analysis controls for state-year fixed effects to adjust for variation over time at the state level as well as additional county-level variables that capture within-state variation in geography, climate, etc. Finally, workers are perfectly mobile and reallocate across counties until nominal wages and utility (adjusted for the local price index) are equalized: w c =Ū P c .
Prices and the Gravity Equation
Assuming perfect competition so that prices and marginal costs (including trade costs)
are equal and letting consumers buy from the cheapest origin county, Eaton and Kortum (2002) give an expression for the price index at d:
where Γ is the Gamma function. Using the assumption that r c = r, Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) 
We can then use the expression for the price index above to write:
( 1) which is the trade cost-weighted sum of consumers' access in d to the technology and inputs of other counties. This is referred to as "consumer market access." Eaton and Kortum (2002) also give the following expression for the value of exports from c to d:
This expression says that trade flows from c to d are increasing in (i) local productivity of c weighted by input costs, (ii) market size of d weighted by trade costs, and (iii) competition from firms with access to d.
Total Income and Market Access
To derive a relationship between total income and market access we assume total income in c is equal to the sum of all expenditures purchased from d:
The interpretation of the final term on the right-hand side, called "firm market access," is the access of firms at c to all consumers in the economy. With the assumption that trade costs are symmetric (i.e., τ cd = τ dc ) the relationship between consumer and firm market access at c must satisfy F M A c = ρCM A c . Following Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) , we define M A c ≡ F M A c = ρCM A c for use in our empirical work. We compute market access by solving the system of non-linear equations given by
As robustness, we also consider the sensitivity of our results to replacing total income, Y d , with population, N d . The system of non-linear equations implied by the theory is M A c =
14 From equation (2), the final steps are to
, substitute the income share for the immobile factor land, apply the assumption that workers move until they are indifferent across locations, take logs and rearrange:
Total income will be higher if a county has higher productivity, more land, or better market access. The increase in total income due to changes in market access may reflect firms' improved access to large markets or consumers with more access to low-cost producers. The relationship between total income and market access may also reflect effects outside of the model, for example, due to existing agglomeration economies that are reinforced by lower trade costs.
Estimating Equation and Identification
To assess the impact of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS), we exploit variation in market access due to the expansion of the highway network from 1960 13 We use the nleqsv package in R to solve this system of non-linear equations (Hasselman, 2016) . 14 Moving from a measure of market access based on total income to a measure based on population exploits the fact
γ , that is, total income is equal to the value of wages paid to all workers divided by labor's share of income.
to 1985 and 2010. Specifically, we estimate:
where Y ct is the total income in county c and year t. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow correlation across counties in the same state over time.
The main variable of interest is the log of market access, which summarizes the proximity In X c , we include a third-order polynomials in the latitude, longitude, and county area interacted with year fixed effects. This controls for the relationship between the outcome variable and smooth changes in county geography. This may be useful in addressing the role of topography, climate, etc., in shaping the economic development of Appalachia, which is stressed by Eller (1982 Eller ( , 2008 , and elsewhere. We also include an indicator for whether a county belongs to a 2010 metropolitan statistical area interacted with year fixed effects.
Finally, we control for third-order polynomials in the distance from a county centroid to the Interstate Highway System, the Appalachian Development Highway System, and mileage of the IHS, ADHS, and other highways within each county (interacted with year fixed effects).
These controls for local highway access allow us to focus on variation in market access that is not due to the choice of placing a highway in or near a particular county.
County (φ c ) and state-year (φ st ) fixed effects control for county characteristics that are fixed over the sample period and changes over time that are shared by all counties in the same state in a given year. County fixed effects adjust for differences in the productivity and physical size of counties that are time invariant. Productivity and the land used in production may vary over time in ways that are both unobserved and correlated with market access. This would be the case, for example, if improvements in highway infrastructure were targeted to integrate counties with high (low) growth potential and would suggest upward More broadly, from equation (1), market access is a function of the travel time-weighted sum of access to the technology and inputs of other counties. As described above, fixing market size in a given year is one approach to addressing concerns about the endogenous reallocation of economic activity due to changes in productivity that are targeted for highway improvements. Another approach is to isolate variation in market access that only reflects changes in transportation costs. To do this we exploit variation due to the change in travel time from a given county c to all other counties. In particular, we compute the predicted average travel time from county c to all other counties according to:
This variable focuses on changes in travel time due to connections between counties not in the same state. In particular, we focus on non-local highway improvements that translate into increased average speed holding the physical distance between two locations constant.
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Importantly, we use no information on market size to construct the instrument since the relocation of economic activity (or population) may be endogenous. As alternatives to equation (5), we consider instruments that exclude destination counties within 250 or 500 miles or an origin county.
To satisfy the criteria for a valid instrument the variable in equation (5) or the other alternatives must be correlated with market access and be uncorrelated with the error term in equation (4). We predict that a county with a higher average travel time will have lower market access; in the next section we provide direct empirical evidence for this first-stage relationship. In terms of the theory, endogeneity may arise due to a correlation between market access and unobserved county productivity. The focus on changes in travel time outside of the origin county's state (or farther away than 250 or 500 miles), exploits variation in market access that comes from changes in travel time due to highway improvements that are not nearby and therefore less likely to be related to local productivity.
Results
In this section we present our estimate of the relationship between total income, population, or income per capita and market access. We also present several robustness checks controlling for local measures of highway access, alternative definitions of market access, and instrumenting for market access. Table 1 Before moving to the results it is useful to provide evidence for two conditions given by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) for the validity of the counterfactual exercises reported in Section 5.2. First, for some counties, removing the the ADHS or replacing the ADHS with an alternative proposal results in large changes in market access. Thus, our counterfactual exercises require the relationship between total income and market access to be based on similarly large changes in market access. Figure 5A shows a histogram for residual market access after controlling for county and state-year fixed effects. There is substantial variation in residualized market access: the difference between the 90 th and 10 th percentiles of (log) market access is 0.534. Second, the relationship between (log) market access and (log) total income is approximately linear in Figure 5B , which provides support for the functional form used in the estimation and counterfactuals. Column 1 of Panel A shows the results of estimating equation (4) with county and state-year fixed effects as well as the baseline controls using ordinary least squares. The estimated coefficient on the log of market access is 1.050, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A show the results from using instrumental variables to estimate equation (4), where we use the predicted travel time from equation (5) as an instrument. The first-stage relationship in column 2 is strong and has the anticipated sign: a 1 percent increase in predicted travel time decreases market access nearly 2 percent.
The Impact of Market Access
Recall that only destination counties outside the state of a particular origin county are used to construct the predicted travel time instrument, so this strong relationship indicates that travel time to distant counties is important for a county's market access and travel times to these counties are less likely to be influenced by (endogenous) local conditions.
From column 3, the magnitude of the estimated second-stage coefficient on market access decreases to 0.642, which suggests that increased market access was targeted to high income or high growth locations.
In Panel B, we show regressions results weighted by 1960 total income. In column 1 the coefficient on the log of market access is 1.945 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. From column 2, the first-stage relationship has the predicted sign and the first-stage Going forward, we focus on results that weight by 1960 total income in order to reduce the influence of outliers-small counties with large changes in market access, total income, or both-although it is comforting that the second-stage results in column 3 of panels A and B are similar.
Finally, in panel C of Table 2 ) percent to changes in total population. This suggests substantial labor mobility, but not enough to offset gains in inflation-adjusted income per capita. This pattern indicates an adjustment in local price indices that equalizes real income across locations in the context of the model or the presence of other factors not included in the model that prevent perfect labor mobility (e.g., migration costs).
Recall that the measure of market access was calculated by assuming a value of θ equal to 8. In Section 5.2 below, we check that the results of our counterfactual exercises are robust to this choice. Before moving to the counterfactual exercises it is useful to note that based on the theoretical relationship between (log) total income and (log) market access from equation (3), we can solve for the implied value of θ. 18 Doing this, we find a value of θ that is approximately equal to 8. The consistency between the implied and assumed value of the trade elasticity is comforting. It is also comforting, as we show below, that the results of our counterfactual exercises are not sensitive to using alternatives values of θ.
One concern with our strategy thus far is that the market access elasticity may not be uniform across the contiguous United States or may vary over time. Table 4 gives the results of including an additional variable that interacts market access with an indicator for whether the county is included in the Appalachian Regional Commission. In particular,
we are interested in whether differences in the structure of the Appalachian economy lead to differences in the estimated coefficient that would influence counterfactual exercises that evaluate the impact of transportation infrastructure in the region. Columns 1 and 2 show the first-stage results, which a strong first-stage relationship and indicate that in market access for counties in the Appalachian Regional Commission is more responsive to predicted travel time. In column 3, the estimated coefficient on the log of market access is similar in magnitude to the main results in Panel B of Table 2 . The coefficient on the interaction term, log(market access) × ARC, is small and statistically insignificant. (2008), we calibrate the share of land (α) and labor (γ) in total income to be 0.05 and 0.34, respectively, and obtain a value for θ of 8.51, which is in line with our assumed value.
in columns 5 through 7 show that the estimated coefficients are approximately equal to one, although the effect in ARC counties is smaller (and statistically different) for manufacturing.
For government employment (column 8) and employment in other sectors (column 9) are less than one: the effect on government employment is statistically significant for all US counties, while the difference between all US counties and ARC counties is statistically significant for "other" employment.
The results for total employment and employment by sector in Table 5 highlight common themes in Appalachian history. That is, while improvements in market access have occurred in Appalachia, the employment gains have been slower than in the rest of the country and the region has benefited less from transportation and trade based employment. In Night Comes to the Cumberlands Caudill emphasized the role of local politicians and efforts by other elites to concentrate political power and wealth. This consistent with work by Eller (1982 Eller ( , 2008 on the history of region and, more recently, lower rates of intergenerational mobility (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez, 2014 ) and higher program participation (Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002) .
Finally, in Table 6 In this sub-section, we have shown that our estimate of the relationship between total income and market access is robust to alternative definitions of market access. We also obtain similar estimates when we consider differences across ARC and non-ARC counties as well as over time. Importantly, it is similar across multiple regions of the country and relatively stable over time. In the next sub-section, we use these results to quantify the aggregate impact of the ADHS across all US counties and whether the effect is primarily concentrated in ARC versus non-ARC counties.
Overall Gains from Appalachian Highways
Together with the estimated elasticity of total income with respect market access, the model provides a natural way to evaluate the aggregate impact of alternative transportation infrastructure policies on the development of the Appalachian region. This approach provides a straightforward way to capture how changes at a point in the highway network influence all counties. In particular, the impact of counterfactual transportation infrastructure can be calculated by first removing (or adding) a portion of the highway network and recalculating market access for each county under this alternative scenario. We then multiply the counterfactual by the elasticity estimated above and sum over all counties to calculate the aggregate impact.
We consider two counterfactual policies. First, we remove the ADHS from the highway network in 1985 and 2010, but let the rest of the highway network grow as it actually did over this period. We then recompute market access exactly as before replacing actual bilateral trade costs with the new counterfactual trade costs. In the context of the panels in Figure 3, we consider removing the black lines associated with the ADHS in each year. Figure 6 shows the difference between the counterfactual scenario of removing the ADHS relative to actual market access. The figure, which denotes counties with less market access in the absence of the ADHS with lighter shades, shows that counties in the center of Appalachia (i.e., those included in the ARC) would have experienced the largest decline in market access while those on the periphery continue to be well-served by the rest of the highway system. Second, we replace the ADHS in 2010 with the smaller highway network initially planned under the President's Appalachian Regional Commission and continue to allow the IHS network to expand as it actually did. The PARC plan was approximately 1,000 miles smaller than the prevailing ADHS network. Some of these additions were political concessions that were necessary to pass legislation in 1965 that had failed to pass in the previous year. That is, many of those miles were added to gain political support or were patronage for eventual supporters of the ARC. The first row of Table 7 reproduces the estimated elasticity from Table 2 The remaining rows of Table 7 examine the robustness of these results. Moving down the table, we show how the estimated income loss changes under alternative definitions of the market access variable. For example, we allow the speeds of the non-ADHS portion of the network to increase to their modern speeds, which decreases the losses associated with the ADHS from $33.4 to $22.9 billion (row 1). This is consistent with the ADHS becoming less valuable as substitutes on the network become relatively more attractive due to increased speeds. Subsequently increasing the speeds on the ADHS increases the losses to $35.2 billion (row 2). Increased losses reflect the higher relative value of the ADHS after speeds are increased.
The next two rows of Table 7 ) percent annually. From row 1 of Table 7 , the rate of return decreases to 2.8 (= 22.9−10.9 415.8
) percent when we allow for modern travel speeds.
The largest effect comes from using the estimated elasticity in row 3 and implies a rate of return of 6.7 (= 39.0−10.9 415.8
) percent. Rates of return between 2.8 and 6.7 are below the 9 percent Allen and Arkolakis (2014) find for the Interstate Highway System and the 11 to 25 percent Alder (2015) finds for highways in India.
The last issue we examine is whether the people targeted by the program were the actual recipients of the benefits. The results in Table 7 includes the losses to all counties in the United States in the absence of the ADHS and it is possible that this effect was not concentrated among the counties targeted by the ARC. In Table 8 we examine the distribution of the counterfactual effect between the ARC and non-ARC counties. In panels A and B, the first row reports the decrease in income associated due to the removal of the The loss of $30.1 billion is large given the lower total income in ARC counties relative to non-ARC counties-approximately 3.4 percent of total income in ARC counties. Importantly, workers are mobile and so endogenously reallocate across counties in response to a change in transportation infrastructure. To the extent that Appalachian counties looked more attractive due to improved market access, some of the potential gains in income per capita will be mitigated by population change. The second row of Table 8 shows that across all counties the average person in ARC counties would have earned $586 less annually in the absence of the ADHS in 2010 and $365 in 1985; this effect is smaller for non-ARC counties (column 2) and close to zero for counties not in states included in the ARC program area (column 3). Overall for ARC counties the effect is roughly 1 percent of income per capita estimates at https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter1.cfm.
or, alternatively, approximately one-third the value of current food stamp benefits.
In Panel C, we find similar effects given the size and corresponding change in market access under the PARC plan. When the ADHS is replaced with the highway network proposed by PARC the losses in total income for ARC counties were $11.8 billion in 2010.
The PARC plan included 1,500 highway miles instead of the 2,500 miles in the ADHS. We assume that the cost of PARC would have been proportional (in miles) to the ADHS, i.e., the marginal benefit of each additional mile is the same, and obtain a counterfactual rate of Although it did not eliminate regional differences between Appalachia and the rest of the country, the ADHS was successful at targeting of benefits and did yield a positive rate of return overall. Relative to other major infrastructure projects in the United States, the impact of the ADHS was smaller than the Interstate Highway System (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014) and compares favorably with the Tennessee Valley Authority (Kline and Moretti, 2014) . (4). Column 1 shows the firststage result with log of market access as the dependent variable. Columns 2 through 4 show the second-stage results using log of total income, income per capita, and total population, respectively, as the dependent variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. The number of counties used is 3,080 and the total number of observations is 9,240. (4) including an additional interaction term between log of market access and an indicator for whether a county is included in the Appalachian Regional Commission. Columns 1 and 2 show the first-stage results with the log of market access and the interaction term, respectively, as dependent variables. Column 3 shows the second-stage results with total income as the dependent variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. The number of counties used is 3,080 and the total number of observations is 9,240. (4) replacing log of total income as the outcome with log of employment by sector. In addition, the estimates for an interaction term between log of market access and an indicator for whether a county is included in the Appalachian Regional Commission are also shown. Column 1 shows the results for total employment and columns 2 through 8 show the results for the sector given in the heading. In Column 6, "Other" includes the broad category of services, mining, and miscellaneous employment. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. The number of counties used is 3,080 and the total number of observations is 9,240. (4) Notes: The table shows results from the two counterfactual scenarios. Column 1 shows the counterfactual change in total income for counties in the ARC and column 2 shows the change for counties not in the ARC. Column 3 shows the counterfactual change in total income for all sample counties. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. Notes: The tables shows results using alternative instruments when estimating equation (4). Columns 1 and 2 reproduce the first-and second-stage results using an instrument that excludes own-state counties when calculating the predicted travel time instrument. Columns 3 and 4 and columns 5 and 6 show first-and second-stage results using an instrument that excludes counties within 250 and 500 miles, respectively, when calculating the predicted travel time instrument. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. The number of counties used is 3,080 and the total number of observations is 9,240.
A Additional Figures & Tables

